



NRT

Eco Canal '09

After Action Report and Improvement Plan



SERVICIO NACIONAL AERONAVAL



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For information on this exercise, please contact the appropriate point of contact (POC):

NRT Contact:

Ed Levine (NOAA)
Chair of the NRT-ACP Subcommittee
USCG Battery Park Building
1 South Street, room 329
New York, NY 10004-1499

E-mail: ed.levine@noaa.gov

ACP Contact:

Octavio E. D'Meza C.
Supervisor Químico
Unidad de Planificación, Preparación y Respuesta, Autoridad del Canal de Panamá
Calle Arnulfo Arias Madrid
Building 752, Balboa
Panama, Republic of Panama

E-mail: oppd-p@pancanal.com

Executive Summary

Synopsis

With 2009 marking the tenth anniversary of the United States transferring Panama Canal authority to the Republic of Panama, it is only appropriate that the EcoCanal '09 Exercise was the most diverse and ambitious NRT-ACP exercise to date. The NRT-ACP Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which provides the basis for the NRT-ACP relationship, stresses the importance of the Panama Canal in international trade and commerce, and both Panama's and the United States' interest in ensuring safe unencumbered operation in the Canal Area. As such, the Parties have continued to develop and refine procedures that facilitate timely and appropriate supplemental assistance in the event of a significant pollution incident within the Canal. As part of these ongoing efforts, mandated in the MOA, annual exercises are held with the NRT and ACP to ensure continuity of communications, planning, and improving emergency response operations in the Canal. EcoCanal '09 was illustrative of these most recent efforts.

The EcoCanal '09 Exercise comprised a two-day Command Post Exercise (CPX) planned by representatives of both the NRT and ACP. The exercise simulated a major pollution incident that occurred within the ACP Contingency Plan area of operations (AOR) and had the potential to impact adjacent jurisdictions. The first day of the exercise focused on the assembly of the ACP Spill Management Team in an Incident Command System (ICS) structure at the Marine Traffic Control Center (MTC). The complexity of the scenario on the second day prompted the decision to form a Unified Command (UC) with other outside response agencies and organizations.

In evaluating these activities and critical tasks, a Joint Evaluation Team focused on assessing the response organizations' capabilities, functions, plans, and agreements.

Scenario

On Wednesday, March 25, 2009 at 0900 hours, N-23B, M/T MARTA CARRIER was traveling northbound, passing under the Bridge of the Americas. The vessel was a gas tanker, fully loaded with butadiene in its tanks. Meanwhile, T/V LISBETH was preparing to depart Dock 7, loaded with marine diesel oil (MDO) and intermediate fuel oil (IFO) 380, with tanks 90% full. Agreements between pilots noted that the M/T MARTA CARRIER would make the necessary adjustments to allow T/V LISBETH to get in the channel for a southbound exit ahead of her, from Dock 7.

At 0910, the pilot of M/T MARTA CARRIER called MTC and the pilot of T/V LISBETH, informing that the vessel's controllable pitch propeller got stuck in the number 4 ahead position and was unable to slow down her speed. Subsequently, the T/V LISBETH was requested to hold while the M/T MARTA CARRIER passed; however, the pilot of T/V LISBETH had already committed toward the channel.

At 0915, M/T MARTA CARRIER struck the T/V LISBETH on its port bow.

First damage assessments on the vessels revealed that the T/V LISBETH was spilling oil from its P1 and P3 tanks at an unknown rate. Each tank has a capacity of 750 cubic meters.

Outcome and Areas for Improvement

Evaluation of agency actions identified several key strengths:

- Participating agencies were able to establish an effective UC despite this being the first time these agencies had done so.
- By the end of Day Two, relationships were being established and an attitude of professional respect for partners' abilities and capabilities was beginning to build.
- Participating agencies were able to work together to develop a comprehensive evacuation plan that addressed geography, timing, logistics, and execution.

Several areas for improvement were also recognized. Among the most significant were:

- The participating agencies need to review, revise, and practice NRT-ACP notification procedures. While the parties were able to coordinate successfully in the end, clear and decisive procedures will facilitate more timely assistance.
- All participants noted the strengths of using a single incident management tool. In addition, all participants were in full agreement that follow-on training and a continuation of unified exercises would greatly increase the readiness posture of the Canal, as well as the entire country of Panama.
- Improved interagency risk communication will allow the early dissemination of a unified public message.

The full results of EcoCanal '09 are discussed in the Issues and Corrective Actions Identification section of this report. In addition, recommended changes, a full list of participants, and a synopsis of participant feedback forms are included as part of this AAR.

The suggested improvement actions offered in this report are recommendations. In some cases, the ACP or NRT may determine that particular tasks and activities are outside of their scope and capability at the present time or in the future. Similarly, alternative solutions may be identified that are more effective and efficient.

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EcoCanal '09 Overview

Exercise Concept and Design

In 2003, 2004, and 2007, three notification exercises were held between NRT agencies and the ACP. The first full functional exercise, Balboa Reach Impact Exercise, was held in Panama City, Panama, in March 2005, and additional functional exercises have been conducted in March 2006 and December 2007.

Subsequently, in June of 2008, NRT and ACP representatives began planning for the fourth functional exercise. The scenario, objectives, and foundation for EcoCanal '09 were conceived and developed during conference calls and finalized with three face-to-face planning meetings (October, December, and February) between the parties. The exercise was structured with the intent of continuing to strengthen the relationship between the ACP and NRT, as well as developing and strengthening relationships with other Panamanian agencies that would be involved if the exercise scenario were to actually occur.

The first day of the exercise focused on: assembling the ACP Spill Management Team using an ICS structure at the MTC; identifying agencies within Panama that would assist in the response; and coordinating with the United States NRT and National Response Center (NRC) to determine their appropriate level of involvement.

Efforts on the second day of EcoCanal '09 concentrated on successfully transitioning from the MTC to the ACP Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Corozal, and the formation of a UC. Additionally, another discussion was held with the NRT to finalize the extent of resources and technical assistance they would provide, as outlined in the MOA.

On the third day, a debrief was held to discuss successes and potential areas for improvement.

General Description

The exercise was designed to provide participants with an opportunity to assess current capabilities to perform the critical tasks required to respond to a major oil spill and chemical release in the Canal Area and adjacent jurisdictions. By assessing those capabilities, participants identified strengths, weaknesses, and future training needs.

During the exercise, the ACP was able to quickly gather information on the scope of the emergency and identify critical agencies necessary to provide a comprehensive response. Once integrated through the establishment of a UC, participants were able to develop plans that broadly addressed critical issues, helping to mitigate the potential harmful effects on the environment, commerce, and the public.

Though the agencies were able to develop a successful response via the UC, several areas were identified that would improve interagency effectiveness, efficiency, coordination, and interoperability. Improving computer/internet connectivity, participating in additional multi-agency exercises, and providing supplemental position-specific ICS training were identified as critical steps in enhancing interagency cooperation.

Locations of Operations

The exercise scenario was developed to compel participants to provide strategic decision-making during an incident that was determined significant enough to move from the MTC to the EOC in Corozal West, Building 741. The hotwash, held on Friday, March 27, 2009, took place at Centro de Capacitación Ascanio Arosemena (CCAA), the ACP's training center.

Participating Agencies

Multiple Panamanian agencies and multiple U.S. NRT member agencies, as well as representatives from the U.S. Embassy to Panama, participated in the exercise. They are as follows:

Panamanian Agencies

- Panama Canal Authority (ACP)
- Office of the President of the Republic of Panama
 - *National Security Council*
 - *Canal Task Force*
- Panama National Police
- National Aeronaval Service
- National System of Civil Defense (SINAPROC)
- Panama Maritime Authority (AMP)
- System of Emergency Management 911

U.S. Agencies

- U.S. National Response Team (NRT)
 - *U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)*
 - *National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)*
 - *U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)*
 - *U.S. Navy, Supervisor of Salvage (SUPSALV)*
 - *U.S. Department of State (DOS)*
- National Response Center (NRC)
- Embassy of the United States, Panama

Exercise Limitations

In planning this exercise, the joint design team (JDT) attempted to maintain realism for the event while also maximizing training opportunities for the participants. In instances where the two conflicted, realism was sacrificed to maximize training. The following were the "artificialities" for EcoCanal '09:

- Weather for the scenario's trajectories/plumes was supplied by Exercise Control and was not the actual weather; tides and currents were as predicted.
- To meet exercise objectives, it was agreed that all participating agencies and organizations would be assembled at the Incident Command Post (ICP) at the beginning of exercise play on Day Two.
- The control room represented agencies, industry, and local entities not actually playing in the exercise.

- The Exercise Control Staff scripted all response activities that occurred between the end of exercise Day One and the start of exercise Day Two.

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Exercise Evaluation

Evaluation Criteria

The exercise was designed to provide participants with an opportunity to assess current capabilities to perform the critical tasks required to respond to a major oil spill and chemical release emergency in the Canal Area and adjacent jurisdictions. By assessing those capabilities, participants identified strengths, weaknesses, and future training needs.

Evaluators were present at the exercise location to observe and record exercise events, including player actions. Members of the evaluation team, from both the NRT and ACP, completed exercise evaluation forms based on specific criteria established for each of the seven specific objectives. Following completion of the facilitated exercise play, a debrief was conducted to capture observations and opinions from players and identify issues and gaps in the response. In addition, all participants were provided with exercise evaluation forms to record their observations of the exercise. After the debrief, evaluators held a meeting to discuss and collaborate on their personal observations and recommendations. The results of the debrief discussion and evaluation forms are documented in the Issues and Corrective Actions section of the report, which focus on the strengths and areas for improvement resulting from the exercise.

In keeping with the no-fault nature of this exercise, the evaluation embodied in this report examines the plans, procedures, and response systems utilized in this exercise. As an evaluated practice, agency performances were observed and documented in order to make recommendations for future improvements. Evaluator observations focus primarily on overall agency actions and the interaction between agencies, rather than on individual players.

The lessons learned from the exercise will improve coordination between the ACP and NRT, in addition to all parties' preparedness and planning efforts. Further, they will lead to further discussion and training relevant to recognized capabilities and identification of issues.

Objectives

At the onset of designing this exercise, the Exercise Directors and the Design Team agreed upon the objectives of the exercise. The objectives represent what the organizations, as a whole, aspire to achieve through their participation in the exercise. Representatives of the participating organizations formed a JDT. The JDT developed a scenario, control injects, and simulations based on the objectives, and included elements that ensured these objectives were attainable. The JDT developed an evaluation system that focuses on providing objective data on observable response processes and the outcomes of those processes. In short, the response process describes what the response organization, as a whole, needs to do to successfully respond to an incident. The detailed exercise evaluation was based on pre-determined objectives for the exercise, which are as follows:

1. Assess the ability of the response organization to utilize the ICS as a response management system to form a UC that can effectively address impacts of the simulated incident, including:
 - Vessel Salvage
 - Responder and Public Safety
 - Situational Awareness
 - Internal and External Communications
 - ACP Cost Documentation for International Resources
 - Identification of Potential Legal Issues
 - Liaison Issues
2. Assess the ability of the response organization to plan for and transit to another ICP during the exercise while maintaining situational awareness and conducting ongoing response operations.
3. Assess the ability of the response organization to develop a population protection plan that addresses roles, responsibilities, and resources needed to implement the plan.
4. Validate interagency roles and responsibilities, including the identification of the need for additional MOAs for a multi-jurisdictional response to a major oil spill and chemical release that has the potential to impact a populated area.
5. Validate that notification, communication, and coordination protocols between the ACP, NRT, and local response community are appropriate and adequate for a multi-jurisdictional response to the exercise scenario.
6. Assess the ability of the response organization to develop and implement a Joint Media Plan to include news releases, public meetings, and press briefs as appropriate to communicate information and hazards to the public and the media.
7. Assess the ability of the response organization to utilize a structured planning process to develop an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the next operational period.

Evaluation Overview

The exercise was designed to provide participants with an opportunity to assess current contingency response plans to perform the critical tasks required to respond to an oil spill and chemical release in the Canal area and surrounding jurisdictions. By assessing those capabilities, participants identified strengths, weaknesses, and future training needs.

Evaluators were present at the exercise locations to observe and record exercise events, including player actions. Members of the evaluation team, from NRT, ACP, and other Panamanian government agencies completed exercise evaluation forms based on specific criteria established for each of the seven specific objectives. Following completion of the facilitated exercise play, a debrief was conducted to facilitate capture of observations and opinions from players and identify issues and gaps in the response. In addition, all participants were provided with exercise evaluation forms to record their observations of the exercise. After the debrief, evaluators held a meeting to discuss and collaborate on their personal observations and recommendations. The results of the debrief discussion and evaluation forms,

which focused on the strengths and areas for improvement resulting from this exercise, are documented in the Issues and Corrective Actions section of this report.

Lessons learned from the exercise will improve coordination between the ACP and NRT, in addition to all parties' preparedness and planning efforts. Further, they will lead to further discussion and training relevant to recognized capabilities and identification of issues.

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Issues and Corrective Actions

Introduction

The EcoCanal '09 exercise focused on communications and team building. Evaluators were positioned throughout the exercise sites to document the key actions and issues identified during the exercise.

As an evaluated practice, agency performances were observed and documented in order to make recommendations for future improvements. Evaluator observations focus primarily on overall agency actions and the interaction between agencies, rather than on individual players.

Objective: 1

Assess the ability of the response organization to utilize ICS as a response management system to form a UC that can effectively address impacts of the simulated incident, including:

- Vessel Salvage
- Responder and Public Safety
- Situational Awareness
- Internal and External Communications
- ACP Cost Documentation for International Resources
- Identification of Potential Legal Issues
- Liaison Issues

Issue #1.1

Title of Lesson Learned	Advanced ICS knowledge is critical to understanding roles and responsibilities of ICS positions.
Observation	The ICS utilized by the ACP was the response management system used during the exercise. Most individuals had basic and intermediate ICS training; few had advanced or ICS position-specific training. Evaluators and players noted that the participants needed additional training for (1) the position they filled, (2) using ICS forms, and (3) interaction requirements between the Units and Sections of the response organization. Although the ACP requires the use of ICS for exercises and responses, there is no national policy to require its use by other agencies/organizations.
Discussion	Intermediate ICS training was provided twice prior to the exercise. All exercise participants from ACP and outside agencies and organizations were invited to attend; however, not all exercise participants attended. It became apparent during the exercise that, although familiar with the basic knowledge of ICS, most participants were not familiar with roles and responsibilities of their position. This lack of training and experience was identified during the design phase of the exercise and the NRT provided ICS coaches. It should be noted that Panama is working on a multi-agency agreement that will look at broader national policy to implement ICS

	<p>(Unified Command) during incidents in the Canal area. SINAPROC and the National Security Council are providing the lead support to the ACP to accomplish this task.</p> <p>Additionally, observers from the U.S. Embassy concluded that the processes taught and practiced during the exercise would be of great utility to other Panamanian and U.S. government entities.</p>
<p>Lesson Learned</p>	<p>Utilization of a response management system such as ICS is central to effectively managing a response. All response personnel need at least a basic understanding of ICS. Personnel holding key positions, especially Command and General Staff and Unit Leaders, need to possess advanced ICS knowledge and have a firm grasp of the roles and responsibilities that their position demands.</p> <p>ACP is working on implementing the Performance Evaluation for Emergency Preparedness Program (SEDEPE in Spanish), which includes a comprehensive training program for oil, hazmat, and key ICS positions. Within the SEDEPE, ACP plans to target those key positions needing advanced ICS knowledge and, most importantly, that need to continue to regularly train and participate in exercises and refresher courses.</p>
<p>Recommendations</p>	<p>In the absence of national Panamanian policy to use ICS, each agency that prescribes ICS as a response management system should continue to train its personnel. Each agency/organization should develop a training plan and qualification criteria for each role within the ICS organization. Each agency/organization should identify response personnel who will fill roles in an ICS structure and ensure that ICS and position-specific training is provided to these personnel. In addition to position-specific training, agencies/organizations should consider team training to foster strong the relationships and team building before an incident happens.</p> <p>Further, agencies should continue to conduct drills and exercises using ICS to strengthen ICS skills. And with that, the NRT-ACP Subcommittee when revising the NRT-ACP Incident Response Guide (IRG), should note the means in which to request USCG (or other NRT Agencies) Incident Management Assist Teams (IMATs) who could provide ICS expertise/coaching during a response.</p> <p>Lastly, due to the U.S. Embassy's role as stated in the NRT-ACP MOA, it is essential for U.S. Embassy personnel to remain wholly involved with ongoing NRT-ACP Subcommittee efforts and future exercises.</p>

Objective: 1

<p>Assess the ability of the response organization to utilize ICS as a response management system to form a UC that can effectively address impacts of the simulated incident, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Vessel Salvage○ Responder and Public Safety○ Situational Awareness○ Internal and External Communications○ ACP Cost Documentation for International Resources○ Identification of Potential Legal Issues○ Liaison Issues	<p><i>Issue #1.2</i></p>
<p>Title of Lesson Learned</p>	<p>Unified Command should be composed of personnel with decision-making authority.</p>
<p>Observation</p>	<p>EcoCanal '09 was the first time the ACP participated in an exercise that included participants from external agencies and organizations. Based on the simulated pollution scenario, the Unified Commanders were appropriate for existing jurisdictions and authorities.</p> <p>Given the scope of the exercise scenario, there was a need for an integrated multi-agency response organization. Some of the Sections and Units had little to no representation from agencies/organizations outside of the ACP.</p>
<p>Discussion</p>	<p>Some of the Incident Command (IC) representatives in the UC did not have decision-making authority; the situation was corrected when these personnel were replaced by personnel who did have the authority. It should be noted that exercise artificiality contributed to this issue; the exercise was used to train personnel.</p> <p>During the Player Debrief, participants from several Sections and Units stated that they would have been more effective if they had staffing from other agencies and organizations. The Liaison Staff comprised agency representatives who felt disconnected, and they expressed that they would have been more effective in the Operations Section.</p>
<p>Lesson Learned</p>	<p>For UC to be effective during a response, the Unified Commanders must have the authority to commit agency/organization resources to the incident and have the authority to spend agency/organization funds.</p> <p>Recognizing that each agency has different capabilities and plans, simulated response efforts would have been improved if there had been greater agency diversity throughout the response organization. Representation from other agencies/organizations would have enabled the Sections and Units to understand other agency/organization's roles,</p>

	<p>responsibilities, resources, and capabilities. All agencies with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for any or all aspects of an incident, and those able to provide specific resource support should participate within the UC structure and in doing so:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribute to the process of determining overall incident strategies; • Select objectives; • Ensure that joint planning for tactical activities is accomplished in accordance with approved incident objectives; • Ensure the integration of tactical operations; and • Approve, commit, and make optimum use of all assigned resources.
<p>Recommendation</p>	<p>All agencies participating in any capacity of the response operation would be well served to place representatives throughout various Sections and Units of the response organization, as appropriate. This ensures the presence of critical knowledge, diverse backgrounds, and experience necessary to establish a multi-agency response effort. Continue to conduct multi-agency exercises that will reinforce the lessons learned during EcoCanal '09. Additionally, ACP should seek the opportunity to lead some tabletop exercise prior to the yearly EcoCanal command post exercises.</p> <p>A multi-agency agreement in Panama may incorporate polices and procedures to define the relationship among the different command posts that exist in individual agencies at the onset of a real multi-jurisdictional incident.</p>

<p>Objective: 1</p>	
<p>Assess the ability of the response organization to utilize ICS as a response management system to form a UC that can effectively address impacts of the simulated incident, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Vessel Salvage ○ Responder and Public Safety ○ Situational Awareness ○ Internal and External Communications ○ ACP Cost Documentation for International Resources ○ Identification of Potential Legal Issues ○ Liaison Issues 	<p><i>Issue #1.3</i></p>
<p>Title of Lesson Learned</p>	<p>Effective internal communications is critical in managing a response.</p>

<p>Observation</p>	<p>Effective internal communications was lacking during the exercise; players were not familiar with roles and responsibilities of other Sections, nor with the flow of information needed within and among the Sections to efficiently manage the response. Additionally, the lack of documentation of internal communications hampered the effectiveness of the response organization.</p>
<p>Discussion</p>	<p>There is a need to improve communications within and among the Sections. Understanding the roles, responsibilities, and information needs of the entire response organization would have aided the response organization with facilitation of effective internal communications.</p> <p>Key elements of information were inaccurate or missing because communications were not documented properly, if at all. Some examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was a request for an ambulance to report to a certain area. This request was never completed in writing; consequently, when the message was relayed to the “field” it was dispatched to the wrong area. • All plans and requests for equipment or support were conducted orally until well into the second day of the exercise, when it became apparent that several key elements of information had been lost or not completed. When written requests became part of the ordering process, the process became more effective. • Poor communication regarding unit scale (meters vs. kilometers) created confusion regarding the down wind area of concern. • Each section maintained different logs and different information on the logs; Unit Logs (ICS Form 214) were not completed. • The meeting schedule was posted but it lacked specific information, such as who was to attend each meeting. As a result, before each meeting, the Planning Section Chief had to notify attendees, and meetings started late or without the correct people being present.
<p>Lesson Learned</p>	<p>To effectively manage a response, response personnel should be aware of the roles and responsibilities of all members of the response organization and the information communication requirements within and among sections.</p> <p>Documentation of communications between members of the response organization ensures that accurate information is communicated and key decisions recorded. Use of Unit Logs (ICS Form 214 or a comparable form) to document key events occurring in a Unit/Section ensures that comprehensive documentation is performed and is consistent with ICS protocols.</p>

Recommendation	<p>ICS training should emphasize common responsibilities and information flow within and among sections. The training should also emphasize the importance of documentation. Future exercises should strive to reinforce effective internal communications, documentation, and common responsibilities of the response organization.</p> <p>The ACP SEDEPE, which is in the process of being approved, will help address this issue.</p>
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Objective: 2

Assess the ability of the response organization to plan for and transit to another ICP during the exercise while maintaining situational awareness and conducting ongoing response operations.	<i>Issue #2.1</i>
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Title of Lesson Learned	An ICP transition plan is critical to efficiently managing response operations.
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Observation	The exercise scenario was developed to escalate in scope at the end of the first day to trigger the transition from an IC to a UC on Day Two. One of the exercise objectives was for the response organization to develop an ICP Transition Plan. An ICP Transition Plan was never developed. It was noted, however, that the artificialities of the exercise might have been a main contributor to not completing such a plan.
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Discussion	<p>The ACP's Contingency Plan identifies the MTC as the location for the Initial ICP. The plan also identifies the EOC located at Corazol as a secondary ICP location for an expanded response organization. The exercise was designed to conduct response operations with ACP personnel operating in a single Incident Command organization, with the scenario hazard [oil spill and potential Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) release] impacting areas outside of the ACP property to allow for a transition to a UC on the second day of the exercise. The Day One exercise players were briefed that they were expected to develop an ICP Transition Plan by the end of the first day of the exercise; a plan was not developed. It should be recognized that exercise artificiality directly contributed to the failure to develop a plan. ACP personnel who were participating in the exercise were also involved with the set up of the secondary EOC (Corazol EOC) prior to the beginning of the exercise, which included: Section layout, tables, chairs, phones, copier, forms, administrative supplies, signage, and situation maps/charts. Although not developed during the exercise, a plan was developed prior to the exercise to ensure the secondary ICP was fully set up and operational for the second day of the exercise. The opportunity exists to use the plan that was developed prior to the exercise as a starting point to develop an ICP Transition Plan that can be added to the</p>
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	<p>Contingency Plan.</p> <p>While the ACP's Contingency Plan currently contains a general transition procedure, the Plan can be enhanced with details of layout and equipment as described in the above discussion.</p>
Lesson Learned	<p>In crisis situations, streamlining the amount of decisions to be made is helpful. This is particularly true when faced with a significant spill and the dozens of actions that must happen simultaneously begin to occur. To enable the response organization to be more efficient, the Contingency Plan should include pre-identified ICP locations, a template for an ICP transition plan, and a checklist that identifies minimum requirements for ICPs.</p>
Recommendation	<p>A workgroup should be assembled to develop an ICP Transition Plan that includes at a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criteria for transitioning ICP; • Pre-identified potential ICP locations; • ICP Layout; • Infrastructure support needs, e.g., tables, chairs, phones, computers, printers, Internet connectivity, faxes, copiers, administrative supplies, etc.; • Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for use of the equipment in the ICP to guide response personnel; and • Methodology to communicate the decision to relocate the ICP to response personnel. <p>The ICP Transition Plan and procedures developed by the workgroup should be included in the Contingency Plan. Response personnel should be trained on the ICP Transition Plan and procedures.</p>

Objective: 3

Assess the ability of the response organization to develop a population protection plan that addresses roles, responsibilities, and resources needed to implement the plan.	<i>Issue #3.1</i>
Title of Lesson Learned	Pre-established agreements with agencies and organizations are vital for developing a comprehensive Population Protection Plan.

Observation	Although never formalized into a plan, it became apparent during the Tactics meeting, that the different agencies were able to develop an evacuation plan. It was detailed in geography, timing, logistics, and execution. The evaluator stated that it was definitely a strength demonstrated during the exercise.
Discussion	<p>While the plan was a collaborative effort by participants from several agencies, it was acknowledged that the Ministry of Health (MINSA) and the Panama Environmental Agency (who did not participate in the exercise) would have provided valuable input into the plan development. The possibility of including MINSA was discussed during the planning process, however, since the scenario did not involve individuals being exposed or contaminated, the planning team focused on the agencies involved in the evacuation aspects.</p> <p>The evacuation plan developed was based on the exercise scenario and the potential hazards as presented; however, the players did not develop contingencies if the scenario were to change drastically.</p> <p>The plan did not adequately address the transportation needs to move personnel and pets out of the evacuation area.</p>
Lesson Learned	The lack of adequate pre-established agreements with transportation resources, traffic control, and a sound notification system to all residents, businesses, and organizations in potentially affected areas may prevent the safe evacuation of people, thus increasing the probability of a larger number of casualties.
Recommendation	<p>SINAPROC should consider establishing an agreement with the Administration of the “Gran Terminal” and with other transportation resources. Further, because many residents may insist on not leaving pets behind, agencies should consider collaborating with the veterinary faculty of medicine and the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA). Coordinate with potentially affected hospitals that may need additional time for evacuation of patients with special needs.</p> <p>Engage all stakeholders to participate in future exercises that assess the development of Population Protection Plans.</p>

Objective: 4

Validate interagency roles and responsibilities, including the identification of the need for additional MOAs for a multi-jurisdictional response to a major chemical release that has the potential to impact a populated area.	<i>Issue #4.1</i>
Title of Lesson	Interagency coordination is an opportunity for pre-incident collaboration.

Learned	
Observation	Although this was the first time many of the agencies participated in a UC exercise, interagency communication and coordination during the exercise proved to be efficient and effective.
Discussion	<p>One of the key reasons this exercise was successful was the outstanding interagency coordination and communication amongst all participants. Agencies at all levels were able to merge into an effective response organization. Particularly noteworthy were the working relationships developed among the ICs. All of the ICs were able to agree on priorities and strategies and keep the response organization running efficiently. In addition, personnel assigned to the Command and General Staff were able to come together from a variety of agencies and were extremely cooperative in supporting the UC's response objectives and priorities. During the post-exercise debrief, almost every Section remarked on how well all of their players were able to work together, despite the differences in their backgrounds, training, and interests represented.</p> <p>The exercise provided an excellent opportunity for participants to become familiar with each other's authorities, roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and resources. This knowledge will prove to be useful for future exercises and/or incidents.</p>
Lesson Learned	Conducting an exercise with personnel from all agencies and organizations that would respond to a real incident enhances realism and presents an opportunity for pre-incident collaboration. A cohesive unit was formed from a myriad of responders, and the synergy they developed helped the UC to perform efficiently under simulated strenuous conditions.
Recommendation	All participating agencies should seek all possible opportunities to participate in multi-agency exercises to foster professional relationships, enhance communications with partners, and improve understanding of their response partners. All plan holders should encourage participation in exercises from all stakeholders, as much as possible.

Objective: 5

Validate the notification, communication, and coordination protocols between the ACP, NRT, and local response community are appropriate and adequate for a multi-jurisdictional response to the exercise scenario.	<i>Issue #5.1</i>
Title of Lesson Learned	Understanding DOS requirements for providing training through the NRT.

Observation	Current NRT-ACP policy does not adequately address DOS requirements for providing training to foreign governments. In addition, further understanding is required on how the NRT should coordinate and interact with DOS during exercises or actual events.
Discussion	During the design phase of the exercise, DOS and USCG lawyers expressed concerns with the ability of the NRT to meet current intergovernmental training and assistance requirements. Also, during the execution of the exercise there was some question as to when and how DOS should be notified.
Lesson Learned	International law surrounding how and who may give training between governments is well defined and existing protocols should be trained and followed.
Recommendation	<p>The NRT-ACP should familiarize personnel with existing DOS procedures and then review/revise the NRT-ACP IRG accordingly. This review should include staff members of the U.S. Embassy in Panama to ensure it is in alignment with current policy and DOS goals. Member agencies should also be aware of individual internal agency policy and be familiar with DOS requirements in providing training to foreign governments. In addition, the review team should look to include a step within the IRG to brief the NRT Co-Chairs prior to making a decision to activate the full NRT process, as outlined in the NRT-ACP MOA. Then:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train NRT members and ACP counterparts; • Review the NRT Call Roster for completeness as well as accuracy; • Verify initial notification roster with the NRC; and • Conduct re-occurring periodic phone drills led by the NRC.

Objective: 5

Validate the notification, communication, and coordination protocols between the ACP, NRT, and local response community are appropriate and adequate for a multi-jurisdictional response to the exercise scenario.		<i>Issue #5.2</i>
Title of Lesson Learned	NRT-ACP communication and coordination procedures should be reviewed, revised, and regularly practiced.	
Observation	In accordance with the NRT-ACP IRG, dated March 9 2009, the ACP notified the NRT about the simulated pollution incident during the exercise. The NRT-ACP IRG is newly revised and it became apparent	

	<p>during the exercise that personnel were unfamiliar with the procedures outlined in the IRG—an issue that proved to be problematic. Additional content should also be added/updated in the IRG.</p>
Discussion	<p>Standard protocol delineated in the IRG prescribes that the ACP will call the NRC when it has been determined that a significant pollution incident has occurred. The ACP encountered a major delay in contacting the NRC because ACP employees did not know how to call an international “1-800” number using the phone system in the ICP.</p> <p>On the second day of the exercise, the ACP players called the NRT to arrange a teleconference with only a three-minute lead-time. This is outside of the standard protocol identified in the IRG and resulted in an absence of many NRT member agency representatives who should have been on the call; therefore, their roles had to be simulated.</p> <p>Players would have been more successful if the protocol for setting up a conference call between the NRT and ACP were identified in the IRG. The conference calls would have been more effective if an agenda was developed, distributed, and followed during the calls.</p> <p>Some of the members of the NRT who participated in the teleconferences indicated that they were not given enough situational awareness information to make sound decisions or recommendations for how they could support the response efforts.</p>
Lesson Learned	<p>Comprehensive guidance and procedures documented prior to incidents will enable the response organization to be more effective with notifications and requests for assistance. Equally as important is ensuring that all response personnel are familiar with the pre-identified guidance and procedures.</p>
Recommendation	<p>A workgroup comprising NRT and ACP personnel should be assembled to update the current NRT-ACP IRG to include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A template to document incident information to ensure comprehensive situational awareness is provided to personnel participating in the NRT-ACP conference calls. USCG ICS Form 209, Incident Status Summary (or comparable form), could be used as an example. • Procedures for NRT-ACP conference calls, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Number (202-372-2430) to call to request the conference call and specific instructions for dialing a “1-800” number from Panama; ○ The minimum amount of lead time necessary to schedule a conference call; and ○ A sample agenda that should be used during the call. This agenda could be included in the IRG and would allow ACP personnel to quickly organize necessary information prior

	<p>to calling for NRT support.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy for designating an ACP person to serve as an NRT Liaison who could facilitate coordination with the NRT during a response. One person should serve as the liaison throughout the response to ensure continuity. It is important to note that the Supervisor Chemist from the Oil Spill Prevention and Control Section at the ACP would play that role during an actual incident, however, due to the dynamics of the exercise, the position was not filled. Mechanisms should be developed to assist with communications and situational updates, e.g., emails, websites [ResponseLink accounts], etc. • Validation of the capabilities currently listed in the IRG and addition of IMATs. • Update NRT agency capabilities and points of contact. <p>Once the IRG is updated, ensure that all personnel who will potentially be involved in NRT-ACP communication and coordination receive training on the contents of the IRG. In addition to IRG training, personnel must also receive training on the NRT-ACP MOA (dated 1 April 2002). ACP should also conduct basic training on the NRT organization and how it can provide assistance during a response.</p> <p>The next NRT-ACP exercise should include an assessment of the updated IRG and the notification, communication, and coordination procedures outlined in the guide. The ACP and the NRT should consider scheduling notification drills more than once a year.</p>
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Objective: 5	
Validate the notification, communication, and coordination protocols between the ACP, NRT, and local response community are appropriate and adequate for a multi-jurisdictional response to the exercise scenario.	<i>Issue #5.3</i>
Title of Lesson Learned	Computer/internet connectivity between agencies allows for a more efficient response.
Observation	The computers that were available in the ICP were on the ACP's network. Personnel from agencies other than the ACP did not have accounts to access the computers. Because the computers were behind the ACP firewall, there were limitations to internet access.

Discussion	<p>Only ACP personnel were able to access computers in the ICP. Personnel from other agencies were not able to access their plans, which were stored on the internet, because of limitations to internet access.</p> <p>Additionally, several NRT products were developed including write ups on the chemical involved and the identified location of the inhibitor. However, when these documents were forwarded to the ACP via email, the computer system at the EOC was not configured to receive emails.</p> <p>Members of the Joint Information Center (JIC) commented that if connectivity were improved, they could begin to look at which websites to use to effectively communicate the UC's message; share media lists, contacts, and samples of messages used during past incidents; and determine what agencies can do to assist. Lack of connectivity hampered players' ability to optimally perform their jobs.</p>
Lesson Learned	<p>In a multi-agency response organization, all personnel need to have access to computers and have internet connectivity to be able to perform their roles in an efficient and effective manner.</p>
Recommendation	<p>The ACP should consider establishing guest accounts for personnel who respond to ACP ICPs. This will allow all personnel to have access to computers. Additionally, consider providing computers that are not behind agency firewalls and have unlimited internet access. This recommendation will need to be discussed with Systems Support at the ACP who establishes these types of policies.</p>

Objective: 6

<p>Assess the ability of the response organization to develop and implement a Joint Media Plan to include news releases, public meetings, and press briefs, as appropriate, to communicate information and hazards to the public and the media.</p>	<p><i>Issue #6.1</i></p>
<p>Title of Lesson Learned</p>	<p>A JIC should be established early and adequately staffed to assist in successfully presenting response efforts to the public.</p>
<p>Observation</p>	<p>The exercise provided an opportunity for the establishment of a JIC; however, it was only staffed by personnel from two of the participating organizations. It should be noted that the ACP received confirmation from outside government agencies that they would attend the exercise. However, several of these agencies were not able to participate, which meant critical roles within the JIC were not filled.</p> <p>The space that the JIC utilized during the exercise did not have adequate infrastructure to support their needs. It was agreed upon by the Unified</p>

	<p>Commanders to allow the ACP Incident Commander to approve all press releases prior to dissemination to the simulated media. The JIC never communicated hazards and/or potential hazards to the public. The JIC relied on gaining situational awareness of the simulated pollution incident from the Unified Commanders.</p>
<p>Discussion</p>	<p>The USCG Public Information Assist Team (PIAT) provided pre-exercise JIC and Risk Communications training. Several of the agencies/organizations participating in the exercise sent public affairs professionals to the training, but only two agencies staffed the JIC during the exercise. Current contingency plans and policies do not address the establishment of a JIC during a response.</p> <p>The concept of developing a Joint Media Plan and “speaking with one voice” during a response is new to most agencies/organizations participating in the exercise. Exercise artificiality also hindered the performance of public affairs personnel. Current protocol at ACP calls for public affairs personnel to operate out of their communications center. Establishing a JIC at the ICP impeded the JIC staff ability to utilize the tools needed to perform their job, e.g., computers, printers, fax, internet connectivity, etc.</p> <p>Although the decision by the Unified Commanders to allow the ACP IC to approve all press releases expedited the approval process, this could set a dangerous precedent in that it did not allow the Unified Commanders to “speak with one voice” that incorporates every agency/organization’s message.</p> <p>The speaker preparation for the mock press conference was successfully conducted. In addition to training public affairs personnel on JIC protocols and procedures, the Unified Commanders would have been well served to attend Risk Communications Training. During the mock press conference the ACP IC was the primary speaker, which tended to make the message to the simulated media more ACP-centric.</p> <p>The JIC suffered from lack of staffing from all participating agencies/organizations; perhaps the most critical staff missing were representatives from the public health agencies/organizations in Panama. Given the exercise scenario, the response organization should have been proactively communicating hazards and/or potential hazards to the public—a task that did not occur during the exercise.</p> <p>The JIC obtained situational status updates from the Unified Commanders. ICS prescribes that the Situation Unit maintains the most accurate situational status; therefore, the JIC should have sent a “fact gatherer” to the Situation Unit to obtain the information. Training response personnel on how media relations fit into the ICS process should be a priority.</p>

Lesson Learned	<p>It is important for the UC to put its best foot forward when presenting its efforts to the public. The success of a JIC will depend on its early establishment and a strong emphasis on public outreach. The JIC must be adequately staffed and have the tools and equipment needed to perform successfully. The JIC must learn to get out in front of media inquiries and plan in advance for media events instead of responding to them. Press conferences have a distinct advantage over other types of media vehicles in getting out information about a crisis. Further, press conferences offer Unified Commanders the opportunity to demonstrate unity and allow the media to ask questions they have about the response. An adequately staffed, trained, and experienced JIC will diminish the outcry and repercussions from media, public, and political concerns. For future exercises, ACP will have to follow up regularly with participating agencies to ensure appropriate involvement.</p>
Recommendation	<p>A multi-agency effort should be conducted to determine if the establishment of a JIC should be standard protocol during multi-agency responses. If it is deemed to be a best practice, contingency plans and policies should be updated to include the protocol. The NRT has developed a JIC Model that could be used for development of the JIC process.</p> <p>The process should incorporate at a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JIC staffing; • JIC equipment and infrastructure needs; • JIC roles and responsibilities; • Development of a Joint Media Plan to include: press releases, public meetings, and press conferences; and • Training for JIC personnel. <p>Future exercises that include establishment of a JIC should ensure that all agencies/organizations participating in the exercise are represented in the JIC.</p> <p>Ensure all personnel who will serve as an IC receive Risk Communications Training.</p>

Objective: 7

Assess the ability of the response organization to utilize a structured planning process to develop an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the next operational period.		<i>Issue #7.1</i>
Title of Lesson Learned	Developing a robust IAP will assist in facilitating a comprehensive response.	
Observation	The ICS Form 201 was updated by the end of Day One. The Day Two team constructed an initial IAP that was about to be presented to the Unified Commanders when the exercise ended. The IAP consisted of the correct forms, but did not have the depth of information required for complete and comprehensive task assignments. Although many of the appropriate agencies were well represented in the Unified Commanders role, there were very few personnel outside of the ACP in the rest of the response organization, which complicated communications and made it difficult to assign resources and ensure all the required safety or procedural protocols were being observed.	
Discussion	Throughout the construction of the IAP, it became apparent to all members of the UC how useful it was to have their agency partners co-located and available for information and discussion. The deficiencies in the completeness of the IAP could be directly attributed to the fact that there was insufficient agency representation at the Section and Unit levels and the Sections and Units are responsible for creation of the products and work assignments that make up an IAP.	
Lesson Learned	During the development of IAPs, encouraging broad agency representation is critical to facilitate communication, assign resources, ensure safety protocols, and provide a more comprehensive response.	
Recommendation	In preparation for future multi-agency incident responses, include agency partners external to ACP in position-specific training.	

Appendix A: Improvement Plan Matrix

Improvement Plan Matrix

The Improvement Plan Matrix is a tool to track assigned improvement actions and their ongoing status.

Issue	Recommendation	Responsible Party/Action Office	Date Assigned & Completion Date	Points of Contact (POC)
NRT-ACP Communication and Coordination	Update NRT ACP IRG.	NRT/ACP Sub-committee		
	Train ACP and NRT on new IRG policy and procedures.	NRT/ACP Sub-committee		
	Set up, schedule, and conduct ACP/NRT notification drills.	NRT/ACP Sub-committee		
NRT-ACP MOA	Review and train NRT Member Agencies on procedures outlined in the NRT-ACP MOA and IRG.	ACP/NRT/DOS Panama		
ICS	Investigate the possibility of instituting a National Incident Management System in Panama.	ACP, Panamanian Presidents Office		
	Create an ongoing training program in the chosen Incident Management System that focuses on interagency coordination and communication and individual roles in the chosen system.	ACP, Panamanian Presidents Office		

UC	Continue to conduct multi-agency exercises that will reinforce the lessons learned during EcoCanal '09 by using the UC approach to all future exercises.	ACP, Panamanian Presidents Office		
JIC	The establishment of a multi-agency workgroup to determine if the establishment of a JIC should be standard protocol during multi-agency responses.	ACP, Panamanian Presidents Office		
	Update contingency plans and policies to include the processes or protocols decided upon.	ACP, Panamanian Presidents Office		
Internal Communications	In future exercises that involve a JIC, ensure that all agencies/organizations participating in the exercise are represented in the JIC.	ACP, Panamanian Presidents Office		
ICP Transition	Create plan to ensure all personnel who will serve as an Incident Commander receive Risk Communications Training.	ACP, Panamanian Presidents Office		
	Conduct interagency ICS training that emphasizes documentation, common responsibilities, and information flow within and between sections.	ACP, Panamanian Presidents Office		
	A workgroup should be assembled to develop an ICP Transition Plan. The ICP Transition Plan and procedures developed by the workgroup should be included in the contingency plan. Response personnel should be trained on the ICP Transition Plan and procedures.	ACP		
Command	Investigate the possibility of instituting an interagency command post relationship agreement and transition plan.	ACP, Panamanian		

Centers		Presidents Office		
Interagency Coordination	All agencies should seek all possible opportunities to participate in multi-agency exercises to foster professional relationships, enhance communications with partners, and improve understanding of their response partners.	ALL	ongoing	
Population Protection Planning	Establish an agreement with the Administration of the “Gran Terminal” and with other transportation resources.	SINAPROC		
	Review the possibility and effectiveness of using veterinary faculty of medicine and the WSPA during the development of Population Protections Plans.	SINAPROC		
	Review and update policy and procedures for coordinating with potentially affected hospitals that may need additional time for evacuation of patients with special needs. Make updates to the plans as appropriate.	SINAPROC		
Computer/ Internet	Establish guest accounts for personnel who respond to ACP ICPs so that all personnel have access to computers. Consider locating computers in key locations that are not behind agency firewalls and have unlimited internet access.	ACP		

Appendix B: Agenda

Monday, March 23rd

<i>Time</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Attendees</i>	<i>Location</i>
0800 – 1200	JIC Training	Exercise JIC Participants	CCAA

Tuesday, March 24th

<i>Time</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Attendees</i>	<i>Location</i>
0800 – 1200	Control Room Set Up	As Assigned	MTC Control Room
1000 - 1200	ICS for International Executives (ICS 402)	Agency Executives	CCAA
1300 - 1500	Controller and Evaluator (C/E) Training	All C/Es	CCAA

Wednesday, March 25th

<i>Time</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Attendees</i>	<i>Location</i>
0730	Controllers and Evaluators in Assigned Positions	All C/Es	MTC
0800 – 1000	Participant & Scenario Brief	All Participants	MTC
1000	STARTEX	All players, C/Es	MTC
1515	Day 1 ENDEX	All players, C/Es	MTC
1530 - 1600	Day 1 Player Debrief	All players, C/Es	MTC
1630 – 1800	Control & Simulation Staff Meeting	Control & Simulation Staff	Corozal EOC

Thursday, March 26th

<i>Time</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Attendees</i>	<i>Location</i>
0715	Check In	All Participants	Corozal EOC
0730	Control Room Set Up	As Assigned	Corozal EOC
0800	Controllers and Evaluators in Assigned Positions	All C/Es	Corozal EOC
0800	ICS 201 / Scenario Update Brief	All players, C/Es	Corozal EOC
0900	Day 2 STARTEX	All players, C/Es	Corozal EOC
1500	ENDEX	All players, C/Es	Corozal EOC
1500 - 1545	Day 2 Player Debrief	All players, C/Es	Corozal EOC
1545 – 1615	Closing Remarks	All players, C/Es	Corozal EOC

Friday, March 27th

<i>Time</i>	<i>Event</i>	<i>Attendees</i>	<i>Location</i>
0900 - 1200	C/E Debrief	All C/Es	CCAA
1300	NRT-ACP Subcommittee Meeting	Subcommittee Members	CCAA

Appendix C: Master Scenario Events List

Master
Scenario
Events List

The following table denotes a sample of inputs that were presented to the players and the expected actions to be taken by the players during the exercise.

Date/Time	Description	Expected Action	Notes/Comments
Day 1	Day 1	Day 1	Day 1
9:00 AM	Simulated collision between M/V MARTA CARRIER and T/V LISBETH - see scenario and initial actions for additional details.		
10:00 AM	STARTEX - DAY ONE		
10:00 AM	ACP Response Organization assembled at the MTC.		
10:10 AM	MTC, this is Canal Protection Officer Gutierrez on the Bridge of the Americas. That ship next to the bridge that was involved in the crash looks like it could carry something dangerous to humans, I smell something funny from up here, should we close the bridge traffic?	MTC should ask for information of what the caller sees or provide direction to close or limit traffic on the bridge of the Americas.	If asked about what you see, describe a lot of traffic as it would be on a typical day, mention that you see the ship just north and closer to the west bank with structural damage to the port bow area of the ship. Look at the pictures in the control room.
10:15 AM	MTC, this is the Pilot onboard the T/V LISBETH, I have some soundings to report for all tanks. The vessels has 8 tanks. All the tanks measured 21 feet before the collision. The current reading of all tanks are 21 feet except tanks P1 and P3, which are both at 18 feet and 9 inches.	MTC briefs the Port Captain.	
10:30 AM	Initial assessment from the on-scene CPC should be completed.		
11:00 AM	This is the Canal Port Captain on the field, the dive team from the Miraflores Locks is on scene but the dive team leader stated that he does not think it is safe to dive because there is too much oil in the water. The dive team leader says he will wait until the oil is either contained or dissipated more before diving.	The command post should document and brief the same to the Incident Commander.	

Date/Time	Description	Expected Action	Notes/Comments
11:15 AM	MTC this is the Pilot onboard (specify south bound vessel), if you are not allowing vessel traffic and Pilots are going ashore I need to go also.	Expect some reaction.	
11:30 AM	Hi, this is Melvin Brown from the Liaison Office (CCESD) - we received a call from the office of the Presidencia, they requested that we provide a brief on the situation every 15 minutes until their liaison arrives here. Can you ensure that we are made aware of the latest information?	MTC should brief the person on the phone or get a number to call back for an up to date brief.	For the MTC info only, let them know that the presidency office is interested.
11:35 AM	MTC this is the Pilot onboard (specify south bound vessel), request permission to transit south bound.	MTC should consider cost issues for delaying the vessel, safe navigation by the MARTA CARRIER, and pollution in the area.	(CONTINGENCY INJECT) If vessel traffic is closed, call to request permission to transit due to perishable cargo.
11:40 AM	This is Roy Roylington from Reuters. How much oil has been spilled? DO you plan to shut down marine traffic in the canal? Do you have any estimates of what the cost would be to the world economy if you shut it down? Do you have a news release?	Pass latest confirmed information, command messages, no speculation.	
11:50 AM	A President Office's liaison arrives at the CCESD - Corozal EOC.		
11:55 AM	This is the Pilot on board the M/T MARTA CARRIER, request to know if we can use tugs on scene to pull us further aground? (((If tugs are on scene.))) (If tugs are not on-scene, request that they deploy some tugs to perform task.) By the way, the vessel is running on limited power - will need to get some generators on-scene. The HAZMAT needs to be stabilized by the inhibitors, which need power... Also, at this time - report the latest air monitoring and soundings results.	If they have not already done so - generators should be ordered. Situation update should be communicated throughout the response organization.	The purpose is to prevent the vessel from sinking if it migrates to deeper water.
12:00 PM	This is the pollution control team leader reporting that I am on scene at Corozal and want to know what strategies you want me to deploy.	Make decision after consultation with surveyors, divers, and safety officer unless already clear to begin containment and recovery.	See Equipment list in case you are asked what you have available.
12:05 PM	ACP - MTC should notify the NRT by this time.		Add contingency inject if NRT is not called.

Date/Time	Description	Expected Action	Notes/Comments
12:15 PM	This is the CPC on board the T/V LISBETH, I just saw several brown pelicans covered with oil resting in the water near our ship. Do you have a crew dedicated to capture and treat these birds?	MTC may ask specific location of the birds to know where the ship is located at that moment and provide location.	Track if players come up with a plan or at least discussions to recover and treat affected wildlife.
12:30 PM	This is Raul Mackowiak. I live near the bridge, and there is a chemical smell in the air. Is my family safe, or should we be worried?	Pass latest confirmed information, command messages, no speculation.	
12:45 PM	This is the dive team leader. I wanted to pass that I think it is safe to dive now so we are getting ready to commence dive ops. By the way, there are approximately 15 different types of birds, some on the shoreline and others in the water near the shore line, covered with oil.	MTC should acknowledge notification.	
1:30 PM	Hi this is the salvage barge tugboat Captain, I just wanted to let you know that we are underway from Gamboa and our ETA to the MARTA CARRIER is in 45 minutes (2:15pm).	Acknowledge notification.	
1:40 PM	MTC, this is the Pilot onboard the MARTA CARRIER. The vessel has lost all means of power plant.	Acknowledge notification.	
2:00 PM	Hi, this is the air monitoring team leader, just want to report that I'm on scene and have begun air-monitoring operations.		Need to calculate the arrival of this team once the players dispatch the team.
2:05 PM	Hi, this is Melvin Brown from CCESD. We received a call from the Presidencia's Office, we would like to know if you have come up or will create a plan to prevent oil pollution outside of the Canal and if the pollution leaves the ACP jurisdiction how do you plan to mitigate cleanup efforts in other jurisdictions?	Information should be provided.	
2:15 PM	Hi, this is Mr. Delgado from the P & I Club, can someone at MTC tell me how much money has been spent so far to ensure funds become available as this operation continues?	The Traffic Controller should process this call. Finance and legal would get involved on this inject.	Follow up as needed if you don't get a call within the hour.

Date/Time	Description	Expected Action	Notes/Comments
2:25 PM	Hi, this is the Authorized Person from the T/V LISBETH, I need to know how much money has been obligated so far for accounting purposes.	Provide information.	The Authorized Person calls the OPC at 272-4215.
2:35 PM	I'm Mr. Shultz, the vessel agent of a container ship. I have spoken to other agents about the hold up of container vessels. We really need to get these ships through the Canal before perishables start going bad. How soon can we expect resuming vessel movement? I need to call several companies about their goods getting delayed also.	Provide feedback.	
2:45 PM	Hi, this is Canal Protection Officer Gutierrez on the Bridge of the Americas. Should we begin closing the Bridge of the Americas before rush hour? Is it safe for people to transit on the bridge?	Provide feedback.	(CONTINGENCY INJECT)
3:00 PM	This is the Captain of the M/T MARTA CARRIER. I need to report that the chemical inhibitor will expire in 3 days. Without power the Butadiene may polymerize.	Acknowledge notification.	
3:10 PM	This is (???), I regret to inform you that we will not be able to deliver the generators you have ordered.	Acknowledge notification.	The person calling needs to correlate means of delivery, (e.g., if airplane say aircraft was forced to do emergency landing, if truck say the truck broke down). This inject is to be executed only if the generators were ordered.
3:15 PM	The players should have developed a transition plan for the move to the EOC for Day 2.		
3:15 PM	END OF EXERCISE - DAY ONE		
Day 2	Day 2	Day 2	Day 2

Date/Time	Description	Expected Action	Notes/Comments
6:00 AM	CONTROL prepares over flight information in preparation of the morning brief. 201 updated from Day 1, including expected actions that would have occurred over night.		
8:30 AM	STARTEX - DAY TWO		
8:30 AM	ICS 201 Brief conducted - transition to UC		
8:30 AM	This is the aide of the Minister of Government and Justice, Vice Minister, the Administrator, and the President; this delegation is due to arrive at your command post in about 30 minutes to an hour.	Acknowledge notification.	Time may shift.
9:00 AM	Hi, I'm the team leader from the Police Special Aquatic Forces at Amador establishing a safety perimeter. Do you have a location for me to cover?	This note is for Urho (((Update the ship simulator))).	
9:15 AM	Hi, this is Mr. Ramirez from the Asociacion de Pescadores de Vera Cruz again. I forgot to mention during our previous call that there are several oiled pelicans in the water near some of the fishermen's boats. Is someone doing something about these birds?	Take for action.	
9:15 AM	U/C Brief to agency executives.		
9:30 AM	Hi, this is Mrs. Tapia from the Presidencia's Office, we need to know if you have come up with a plan for treating affected wildlife by the oil? Something like a wildlife rehabilitation plan?	Provide feedback.	
9:35 AM	I like to see an evacuation plan for the potentially affected areas by 3pm today.	Acknowledge notification.	(CONTINGENCY INJECT) Provide this inject if the Minister does not do it once he arrives to the UC.
10:10 AM	This is Brooke Trout from Channel 2 news. We would like to interview the Canal Port Captain.	Pass latest confirmed information about any media conferences or suggest alternate spokesperson.	

Date/Time	Description	Expected Action	Notes/Comments
11:15 AM	This is Mr. Carrion, Operator of the M/T MARTA CARRIER. I like to hire a private salvage company to work my vessel's case, do you have any objections?	Provide feedback.	
11:30 AM	This is Janet McDuffy from the Associated Press. Can you give me an idea on how the oil spill has impacted the global economy?	Pass the latest confirmed information.	
11:35 AM	Hi, this is Mr. Brown from the NRT. Can we schedule a call so that I can get an up to date brief?	Schedule call.	
11:45 AM	This is Mark Jones. I'm a college student from the States and I want to assist in cleaning up the oil. Can I just start cleaning up where I'm at now?	Pass volunteer request to Liaison. Advise to avoid contact with oil.	
1:10 PM	This is Adam Fox from the Mexico City news. Can you tell me the latest information you have regarding the oil spill? What is the danger of the HAZMAT on board the other vessel?	Pass latest confirmed information.	
ENDEX			