

# Norfolk Southern Derailment Graniteville, South Carolina



# Initial Response

- At approximately 0300 on January 6, 2005 a Norfolk Southern Train collided with a parked train in the town of Graniteville, SC.
- Four hazardous materials tank cars derailed (three chlorine, one sodium hydroxide).
- One chlorine car was breached, releasing approximately 40 tons of chlorine; 50 tons remained in tank car.
- Nine fatalities and hundreds of victims reporting respiratory affects.
- 1 mile radius evacuation (5,400 people) and 2 mile radius shelter-in-place.

# Emergency Response Timeline

911 calls (0230 h, 1/6/05)

Shelter In Place (Reverse 911)


Assessment, S&R, Stabilization

Evacuation Ordered (1500 h)

Cleanup

Reoccupation Initiated

Hazmat Ops Concluded



T-0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Residential Assessment

EPA Demobs

State/Local Continue Oversight

**UC Established**

**UC Initiated**

Local, State, RP, Federal


# Response Operations

- Search and recovery mission (Local, State, and Federal agencies)
- Forensic investigation (Local, State, and Federal agencies)
- HazMat / Chlorine operations (NS response contractors with EPA oversight)
- Comprehensive air monitoring network (NS response contractors and EPA emergency responders)

# Response Operations (cont'd.)

- Re-entry sampling of 1,400 homes and businesses  
(NS response contractors, State and Federal responders)
- Business and infrastructure sampling / support (NS response contractors, State and Federal responders)
- Animal rescue and rehab (State and Federal Responders)

# Unified Command: Graniteville Train Derailment



# Lessons Learned

- Responsible Party somewhat reluctant to share information; affected ability to predict timelines for completion.
- Animal feeding/recovery while residents are evacuated requires planning.
- Conducting accident investigation in a hotzone is problematic.
- Standardize data collection immediately.
- Reliable radio communication between emergency responders at various levels is always an issue.

# Lessons Learned

- Responders generally unfamiliar with application of NIMS Unified Command/ICS principles for a major incident:
  - Understanding UC/ICS Chain of Command
  - Early Operations Lacked UC Objectives
  - Coordination / Information Sharing
- Unified Command must share common workspace (resist tendency for individual agencies to hunker down in their own mobile command posts)

# NIMS Alert 008-05

- NIMS *Alert*

NA: 008-05

The NIMS Integration Center, Aug. 17, 2005

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## **NIMS Compliance and Day-to-Day Operations**

The NIMS Integration Center has received a number of questions recently asking if organizations must use National Incident Management System (NIMS) concepts and principles in day-to-day emergency operations versus only during major incidents involving federal participation.

- **“The requirement to adopt and implement NIMS and ICS means NIMS and ICS for incident management every day. Those who don’t are not NIMS compliant.”**

# Lessons Learned

Question: Are we prepared to handle something similar?

Answer: Not likely, unless you and your response partners are truly committed and take the time to plan for how your organizational structure will work.

Solution:

Plan, Plan, and then when you think you've had enough...

**Plan Some More**